The Bicycle Guide to Kill Everyone Advanced Strategies for No-Limit Hold Em Poker Tournaments and Sit-n-Gos

1. 1Write the ratio down before you evaluate the hand: Bubble Factor = prize-EV you lose if you bust or lose the all-in ÷ prize-EV you gain if you win it. Chip counts only supply the inputs. A BF of 1.0 means chips equal dollars, and anything above 1.0 means the all-in costs more than it pays.
2. 2Check first whether the prize structure matters at all. The source's safe rule: if at least five times as many players remain as there are prizes (10 paid, 50 left), ignore the structure and use plain pot odds. Short stacks can ignore it even later. Inside that threshold, start adjusting.
3. 3Estimate your chances of finishing in each paid position with the Independent Chip Model (ICM), which assumes equally skilled players. Compute your prize EV three ways: now, after winning the all-in, and after losing it. Plug the differences into the ratio.
4. 4Remember why the ratio exceeds 1: chip value is nonlinear. Each chip you gain is worth less than the one before, because winning every chip still doesn't win the whole prize pool. Your EV also depends on everyone else's stacks, and a rival's elimination raises your EV even if you gain no chips.
5. 5Locate the situation on the three drivers named in the definition: a satellite or multiple-winner structure, a clash between two big stacks, or a stage just before a prize jump. Each pushes the ratio up, so you need more equity than raw pot odds suggest.
6. 6Check whether you cover the opponent. The source says when you cover everyone at the table your chips have even less relative value, and big stacks can gamble more and raise aggression. If you are covered, your whole tournament is at risk. If you cover, the loss costs less than the win pays.
7. 7Choose the objective. The source offers two: build your stack, or survive one more orbit. A high BF near the bubble, especially in a satellite, makes survival the priority. Fold marginal pushes, since you risk 'two chances at elimination', and call only when the big blind forces you.
8. 8Re-run the check whenever stacks, the number of players left, or the payout position changes. The source lists blinds, average stack, payout structure, players remaining and the bubble factor as moving inputs, so the BF is never fixed for a tournament.

Take the source's 6-handed table: you have 400,000 and each of five opponents has about 200,000. Losing 80,000 in a hand (20% of your stack) leaves you 320,000 and one opponent 280,000. The source says this has almost no effect on table dynamics, because you still lead and can still eliminate any opponent in one big hand. Your chips are cheap to lose, so your BF against these opponents stays close to 1 and you can gamble. Now reverse the roles: an opponent with 200,000 who risks his whole stack against you loses everything, and his elimination only partly helps his EV. His loss in prize EV far exceeds his gain, so his BF is high and he needs a much stronger hand to call you. That asymmetry is the case for pressure from the chip lead. Compare Tysen's own spot: blinds 400/800, 100 ante, 1,000 chips (CSI 0.45), already posting 100 ante and 800 big blind, so he put his last 100 in without looking. With so little left to lose, bust costs almost nothing extra, so nearly any hand is a call. The source gives no numeric BF for these spots. Compute it yourself from ICM using the three-EV method above.

• If at least five times as many players remain as prizes (e.g. 50 left, 10 paid), then treat chips as roughly linear and decide on pot odds.
• If you are near the bubble, especially in a satellite, and a marginal push risks your tournament, then fold more and let survival take precedence.
• If you cover all opponents at the table, then your chips have less relative value, so gamble more and raise the aggression level.
• If a call risks your whole stack against someone who covers you, then require more equity than pot odds indicate, because the loss costs more than the win gains.
• If your stack is very short relative to the average, then the far-from-the-money push-or-fold equilibrium still holds past the 5× guideline, so don't over-tighten.

• Using pot odds as tournament odds near a prize jump. The tell: you call because the chips math is +EV while your payout expectation drops after losing.
• Folding too much with a big stack. The tell: you protect chips that carry little relative value when you cover the table, and so give up the aggression the source says big stacks should use.
• Applying bubble-style tightness far from the money. The tell: you fold standard pushes with 50 players left and 10 prizes, where the structure is irrelevant.
• Treating the factor as fixed. The tell: you carry the same tight or loose calling range after blinds, average stack, or players remaining have changed.
• Ignoring that others' eliminations raise your EV. The tell: you take a risky confrontation even though waiting would let a rival bust and improve your payout.

• ▸Players remaining ÷ prizes paid: is it at least 5×? If yes, use pot odds and stop.
• ▸Stage: satellite or multiple-winner, near a prize jump, or neither? Note which applies.
• ▸My stack vs. opponent's stack: do I cover him, does he cover me, or are we both big?
• ▸Prize EV now (from ICM): estimate in prize units.
• ▸Prize EV if I win the all-in (from ICM): estimate in prize units.
• ▸Prize EV if I lose the all-in (from ICM): estimate in prize units.
• ▸Bubble Factor = (EV now − EV if lose) ÷ (EV if win − EV now): write the ratio.
• ▸Raw pot-odds equity needed vs. equity needed after adjusting for the BF: write both.
• ▸Objective this orbit: build stack or survive? Action chosen: push, call, or fold.

1. 1Separate the two skills before the session starts. Hand reading assesses strength or weakness from betting patterns and board composition. Tell reading detects physical or verbal cues that correlate with hand quality. Both need focus, but they are different skills, so log which one produced each read.
2. 2Classify every opponent by style in the first orbit. Is this a conventional player whose bets map to value, or a new-school LAG who plays a wide range of starting hands deep-stacked? Against Goehring or Antonius types, the source says you can't safely eliminate most starting hands. That changes how much weight a read can carry.
3. 3Record each opponent's starting-hand range and how they bet it. The source asks: what starting hands does each opponent play, and how do they bet them? Note position, raise sizes, limp-calls, and whether they enter raised pots out of position.
4. 4Work backwards through the hand. Take each bet, call, and raise and see how it triangulates with the board. Ask whether the line makes sense for a hand the opponent would play this way, and which turn or river cards the action is consistent with.
5. 5Collect showdown information actively. Negreanu shows hands hoping opponents reciprocate, tells them what he thinks they have, and learns what their checks, bets, raises, re-raises, and check-raises mean. Adapt this by noting every hand shown at showdown and which line produced it.
6. 6Probe for tells separately and treat them as secondary. Watch for physical or verbal cues, including timing, such as Antonius thinking about a minute before his turn raise. Do not let a tell override a betting-pattern read unless the cue has repeated.
7. 7Decide whether a deviation is exploitable. Against a weak or conventional opponent, exploit with wider early-stage play and post-flop outplays. Against a strong LAG, narrow your calling range. When your read is unclear, use the tighter-image approach (55+, AQs+, AK) and steal later.
8. 8Match your style to your read accuracy. The source says speculative hands need great reading and post-flop skills. If you can't yet tell where you stand in a hand, start with a tighter range and widen it gradually as experience grows.

April 2007, Bellagio, $3,120 NLHE, 50/100 blinds, 6,000 starting chips. Alan Goehring (about 26,000) limps UTG with 6-4. Alan Cunningham (about 13,000) holds A-K three seats to his left and makes it 400. Goehring calls out of position. The flop is 5-3-2, giving Goehring the nuts and Cunningham the nut flush draw, two overcards, and a gutshot. Goehring check-raises Cunningham's 700 bet to about 1,600 and then bets about another 1,600 on the turn (a 4), taunting a raise. Cunningham has a wheel by then but doesn't raise. On the river (J) Goehring bets about 6,000 and Cunningham calls after deliberation. The hand cost him 9,600 and left him with 3,400. The read failure is that Cunningham treated a conventional range as the baseline. Goehring was known for taking many flops, even against raises, so the check-raise and turn bet could not be confined to overpairs or sets. Against that opponent the range includes any hand that fits 5-3-2, including 6-4 and 4-x holdings. A more accurate read would have priced the nuts into the range and put more weight on the aggressive line than on Cunningham's own hand strength.

• If the opponent is a loose-aggressive player who plays many hands deep-stacked, then don't eliminate starting hands from their range. Fold or pot-control marginal one-pair and draw hands facing heavy turn aggression, and raise only when you can beat a wide range.
• If you can't identify the opponent's starting-hand range and how they bet it, then play a tighter range (the source suggests as narrow as 55+, AQs+, AK) and wait to steal later.
• If an opponent is weak or inexperienced and stacks are deep, then see many flops and outplay them post-flop. The source says early stages are the best time for better players to capitalize on their edge.
• If a bet, call, or raise sequence doesn't triangulate with any reasonable holding on this board, then reconsider whether you are facing a bluff or an unusual line before you fold. If it doesn't make sense, suspect the unusual hand.
• If a physical tell conflicts with the betting-pattern read, then trust the betting pattern unless the tell has been confirmed repeatedly for this opponent.

• Treating a LAG like a conventional player. Tell: you say 'he can't have that' and are surprised at showdown by hands like 6-4 or T-3.
• Confusing hand reading with tell reading. Tell: you note a physical cue but never check it against the board and the betting line.
• Calling for information without updating. Tell: you reach showdown repeatedly but can't say what that player's check-raise or river bet means.
• Playing speculative hands without the reading skills for them. Tell: you see many flops with suited connectors but lose big post-flop with second-best hands because you couldn't place the opponent.
• Over-reading unusual aggression as strength. Tell: you fold good hands to a thinking-then-raise pattern, as Antonius's one-minute pause and turn raise invites, when the range actually includes bluffs and draws.

• ▸Player/seat: name or description and stack size in big blinds.
• ▸Style class: conventional, LAG, tight, or unknown, with the evidence for it.
• ▸Preflop range seen: hands shown or inferred, with position and raise sizes.
• ▸Flop/turn/river pattern: how they bet, check-raise, or float, and on what boards.
• ▸Showdown log: hands shown and the line that led to them.
• ▸Tell observations: timing or behavior, with the hand quality it preceded (confirmed or unconfirmed).
• ▸Triangulated range this hand: which holdings fit the preflop action, the board, and each bet.
• ▸Exploit plan: the specific deviation to attack, such as stealing, bluffing, or value-betting thinner.
• ▸Confidence (low/med/high): how sure the read is, and whether it supports a stack-risking decision.

1. 1Separate the two ways to win before you bet. A bet or raise wins either when everyone folds or at showdown with the best hand. A call has only the showdown route. Name both before you act, because fold equity is the first route.
2. 2Put a number on each opponent's pot equity: what he wins if the cards are dealt out with no more betting. The source gives two anchors. 76 on K-9-5 against KK wins about 15%. 76 against AKo on A-9-8 has about 34%. Fold equity is the equity he forfeits when he folds, so your share goes from 66% to 100% in the second case.
3. 3Find hands where you are the underdog or only marginally ahead if checked down, yet your opponent can't profitably continue. Folding out a better hand turns negative equity into a positive return. Check that his range includes hands that fold, not only hands that call.
4. 4Size the bet so continuing is unprofitable for his draws and medium hands. The source treats about 50% of the pot or more as a reasonable bet that makes a gutshot fold against a set. If stacks are very deep and implied odds justify a call, treat that opponent as having less fold equity.
5. 5Do the call-case math separately. Price what you risk against what you win if called, and compare it with your equity against the hands that actually call. In the source hand: about 20,000 risked to win 24,000 is 1.2-to-1. You are a favorite against an over-pair or two pair, but a 1.5-to-1 underdog against a set. Accept the underlay only if the folds make up for it.
6. 6Walk through each opponent's decision in turn, including the players still to act behind. Ask what each can beat, what they fear, and how much of their stack is already committed. Players holding only about 5% of their stack in the pot, and facing possible elimination, fold strong-looking hands.
7. 7Play your big hands and your bluffs the same way. The source's reason is that identical play makes you unpredictable, and your big hands then protect your bluffs. The same line also earns "fear equity": opponents think twice about entering pots against you.
8. 8Check whether the fold equity is needed at all. If you hold a hand that is ahead and the opponent can't call profitably, or he will fold anyway, don't overpay. If you decide you are beaten and can't bet him off, fold early. The source's pros do this and give up small pots to win many more.

Early in a major tournament the author faces a board with a big pot of more than 5,000. He is considering an all-in and has eliminated better flush draws and judged a set unlikely from the betting. Any caller adds another 19,000, so he risks just under 20,000 to win 24,000, which is 1.2-to-1. Against an over-pair or two pair he is a favorite. Against an unsuspected set he is a 1.5-to-1 underdog, so he is slightly underpriced there. He accepts that because players with about 5% of their chips committed may even fold bottom set. The results: Jason held AA without the ace of hearts and quickly folded, since he figured he was beaten by a set or a huge draw with three players left to act. Mark Vos folded pocket tens. The next player took 6 minutes, called time on himself, and folded two small pair with 1,225 invested and nearly 19,000 behind. The last player had the nut flush draw, read the author for a set, and folded. Nobody called, the author's stack rose 25%, and he also gained fold equity and fear equity against the table. He says he would have played a set of queens the same way.

• If your opponent's equity is real but his hand can't continue profitably against your bet (a draw or a thin pair, as with 76 on A-9-8), then bet enough to make him fold and take his 34% or 15% as your gain.
• If you are the underdog when called and priced below break-even, then shove only when the folds you expect make up the difference. The source took a 1.2-to-1 price against a set that is a 1.5-to-1 favorite only because folds were likely.
• If an opponent has a small fraction of his stack committed (about 5%) and faces elimination, then expect folds of strong-looking hands, including bottom set.
• If players remain to act behind, then each caller's range gets stronger. The source's Jason folded AA because three players were still behind him, so account for the later hands that could call.
• If you can't bet him off and you are beaten, then fold early. If the opponent is a gutshot facing a 50%-pot bet against a set, folding is correct. Folding is often the right play, and so is giving up a small pot.
• If you can only fold when called, then don't make the bet in a spot that would damage your image. The author refused to 3-bet and fold to an all-in because he wanted to avoid being bullied.

• Assuming a fold you never priced. You count fold equity as certain and ignore the call case. The tell: you can't state your equity against the hands that call, or the odds you were getting.
• Betting too small to cut off a draw. Your opponent continues profitably, and you get a showdown with 66% instead of 100%. The tell: opponents keep calling your flop bets with draws.
• Treating fold equity as a reason to bet every hand. The source says folding often is correct, and a gutshot should not continue against a set. The tell: you keep making bets that get called by hands that beat you.
• Bluffing with a different pattern than your value hands. Your big hands stop protecting your bluffs. The tell: opponents read your all-ins as either value or bluff.
• Ignoring players behind, stack depth, and implied odds. With very deep stacks and good implied odds, a call can be right, and fold equity shrinks. The tell: a shove into someone with several callers behind, or a bet that assumes small bets always fold.

• ▸Pot before my action: record the chips in the pot.
• ▸My bet or raise size: the chips I put in, and the fraction of the pot.
• ▸Opponent's range and equity if checked down: list the hands he could hold and the equity for each (e.g., 15%, 34%).
• ▸Which hands in his range fold, and which call: split the range.
• ▸My equity when called: estimate it against the calling hands only.
• ▸Price if called: chips risked versus chips won, as a ratio (e.g., 20,000 to win 24,000 = 1.2-to-1).
• ▸Stack depth and chips committed: note the percentage of his stack already in (e.g., about 5%) and whether implied odds could justify a call.
• ▸Players still to act: note how many remain and what they could hold.
• ▸Decision and consistency check: bet, fold, or call, and confirm I would play my big hands the same way.

1. 1Establish the precondition: the table has to see that all your chips can go in at any time. The source builds fear equity from big bets with monsters, bluffs and semi-bluffs, so you need a record of stack-threatening bets before it pays.
2. 2Pick targets before you act. Scan for the weak-tight player, whose bets mean strength and whose checks mean he folds to a bet. Unpaired hole cards miss the flop more than two-thirds of the time, so a strong player can take the pot on the flop more than two times in three. A player who won't call without top pair folds to a flop bet the vast majority of the time.
3. 3Make the stack-threatening bet only after you have worked out the opponents' ranges and the stack sizes. Nelson's early shove risked just under 20,000 to win 24,000 if called, about 1.2-to-1. He first eliminated better flush draws and judged a set unlikely from the betting. The bet also had to be one that players could fold, because he expected some to lay down even bottom set when they had committed only about 5% of their chips.
4. 4Play value hands and bluffs the same way: same sizing, same pace, same line. Nelson would have played a set of queens exactly as he played his draw. This keeps opponents from sorting your all-ins into 'real' and 'bluff'. Fear equity depends on that uncertainty.
5. 5Add volume only if you can afford it. Top players give up small pre-flop equity to gain post-flop equity in deep-stack play. Hands: small pairs, suited connectors, 1-gap suited connectors, suited aces, and sometimes unsuited connectors on the button or small blind. Budget each hand with the Rule of 5 and 10 and the Rule of 3 and 6. Use position as the main weapon, as Antonius does, calling raises when he has position on the raiser.
6. 6Back off when out of position, and especially when re-raised. Antonius, at about 75% of hands over 10+ hours, became more cautious in exactly those spots. Keep your range wide only where position backs it up.
7. 7After each hand, record who folded, what they held, and how much they had committed. Then watch whether they stay out of your pots. This is the evidence that fear equity exists. Nelson's expected result was that opponents 'think twice about entering pots in which I was involved.'
8. 8Use the earned control to become table captain, but stay alert. All-in bets in some contexts now draw more suspicion than pot-sized or smaller bets. If opponents start calling your shoves, size down or shift to bets that put the stack at risk without announcing it.

Early in a major tournament, Lee Nelson moved all-in on a draw-heavy board with more than 5,000 already in the pot. Any caller would add another 19,000, so he risked just under 20,000 to win 24,000, about 1.2-to-1, and he had cleared the better flush draws from the likely holdings. The table folded one by one. Jason held AA without the ace of hearts and folded fast, fearing a set or a huge draw with three players still to act. Mark Vos folded pocket tens quickly. The next player had 54 for two small pair and went into the tank for 6 minutes, then folded with only 1,225 invested and nearly 19,000 behind. The last player had the nut flush draw and folded, assuming a set. Nelson says he would have played a set of queens the same way, which is why the 54 player's fear was warranted. The result was a 25% stack increase, plus fold equity and fear equity: every opponent now knew his chips were at risk early, even with the pot small relative to stacks.

• If the opponent is weak-tight (bets mean strength, checks mean he folds to a bet), then bet the flop. He folds the vast majority of the time without top pair.
• If an opponent is a hyper-LAG or another aggressive player, then expect a meta-battle for table control rather than automatic folds. Pick spots you can win, since he won't back down often when challenged.
• If you want to play speculative hands pre-flop (small pairs, suited connectors, suited aces), then size the investment with the Rule of 5 and 10 and the Rule of 3 and 6, and prefer position. If you're not the best or second-best player at the table, then muck trash like 64o. Poker is zero-sum, so the negative pre-flop equity costs you.
• If you're out of position and get re-raised, then tighten up, as Antonius does. His wide range depends on position.
• If your all-ins keep getting called or looked up, then treat the shove as under suspicion and consider pot-sized or smaller bets that still threaten your stack.

• Copying the 64o, 70-75%-of-hands style without top-two-at-the-table skill. Tell: you pay away small pre-flop edges and have no reads, position or post-flop plan to win them back, and you bleed chips on speculative hands.
• Playing bluffs and monsters differently. Tell: opponents fold to your shoves only when you're bluffing, or call only when you have it, so the sizing or timing sorts your hands for them.
• Shoving without range or stack analysis. Tell: you get called by hands that crush you, because you ignored players still to act behind or who had a set, a bigger draw or a better over-pair.
• Using the same all-in play on everyone. Tell: you aim at aggressive players the way you aim at weak-tight ones, and they re-raise or call you down. Or your shoves meet more suspicion than pot-sized bets would.
• Letting intimidation replace reads. Tell: you can't say why a specific opponent folded, and you keep betting after he has stopped folding.

• ▸Opponent / seat: name the player you are targeting and their position relative to you.
• ▸Opponent type: weak-tight, conventional, or aggressive/hyper-LAG, with the evidence for it.
• ▸Stack sizes: your stack, their stack, and effective stack in big blinds.
• ▸Range check: which holdings you removed and which you can't (sets, big draws, over-pairs).
• ▸Bet and risk/reward: amount risked vs. amount you win if called, and the ratio.
• ▸Fold equity estimate: who you expect to fold, and the share of their stack already committed.
• ▸Same-way test: would you play your big hands this way too? Yes/No.
• ▸Result and what they held: who folded, what they showed or said, how long they took.
• ▸Follow-up: did the opponent avoid your next pots, call lighter, or fight back? Note the date or level.

1. 1Pick the street where you extract your edge: the passages say the majority of mistakes occur after the flop, so build plans for post-flop decisions rather than hoping for pre-flop errors.
2. 2Classify each opponent early. Tag tight timid players (afraid to commit chips, reluctant to enter costly pots) as targets to bluff post-flop early and to blind-steal later. Tag overly loose players as targets you do not bluff, because they call too much.
3. 3Choose your entry mode by skill. If you are confident post-flop, play many speculative hands in position while stacks are deep and raises are small relative to stacks, so a hidden hit can stack someone. If not, start with a tighter range and widen it as experience grows.
4. 4If you take the tight route, run a squeaky range (about 55+, AQs+, AK). Raise big pairs (QQ-AA), call small pairs and 99-JJ in raised pots hoping to flop sets, and show aces or kings once or twice. By the 4th or 5th level, begin the aggressive moves, such as coming over the top of a late-position raiser.
5. 5Set a plan for each street before the hand develops. With a strong hand in position, do not over-bet pre-flop and push opponents out; keep the pot big enough to generate value after the flop. With a strong hand out of position in a raised pot, re-raise at least the pot size pre-flop.
6. 6Use bet sizing to induce, not just to win. Small bets, raises and re-raises keep opponents guessing. Bet and raise in ways that make a worse hand call, as when Goehring bet the turn 'taunting' Cunningham to raise and then sized the river to be called. Mix sizes, but only with enough analysis not to become predictable.
7. 7Match your approach to the opponent: exploit non-optimal players, but against most pros stay near equilibrium, because an exploitive play loses more than equilibrium when the opponent switches strategies and your read is wrong.
8. 8Review each hand for what the opponent's error was (fold, call, sizing, too tight/loose) and whether your line caused it.

April 2007 Bellagio $3,120 NLHE, blinds 50/100, 6,000 starting chips. Alan Goehring leads with 26,000+; Alan Cunningham has about 13,000. Goehring, who has been taking many flops even against raises, limps UTG with 6-4. Cunningham, holding A-K, makes it 400, and Goehring calls out of position. The flop is 5-3-2, giving Goehring the nuts and Cunningham a nut flush draw with two overcards and a gutshot. Goehring check-raises Cunningham's ~700 bet to ~1,600, and Cunningham calls. The turn is a 4. Goehring bets ~1,600 more, taunting a raise, and Cunningham does not bite even though he now has a wheel. On the river (J) Goehring bets ~6,000 and Cunningham, after deliberation, calls. The hand costs Cunningham 9,600, leaving him 3,400, and takes Goehring to 35,000+, nearly six times his starting stack at the second level. The induced error was a loose, wide-range image combined with sizing that let a strong but second-best hand pay off. The same sources show the opposite error: a player called 50,000 chips with queens against Jim McManus's aces, thinking they might be good.

• If an opponent is tight and timid and stacks are deep, then bluff and steal pots post-flop early, and attack their blinds later.
• If an opponent is overly loose, then do not bluff them; value-bet and let them call with worse.
• If you hold a strong hand in position, then keep your raise size modest so you do not blow them out of a big pot; if you hold one out of position in a raised pot, re-raise at least the pot size.
• If you lack strong post-flop and reading skills, then tighten your range and widen it gradually; if you are experienced and stacks are deep, then get involved in many early pots.
• If the opponent is a strong pro whose adjustments you cannot predict, then default to equilibrium play rather than an exploitive line, because a wrong read costs more than equilibrium would.

• Over-exploiting on a bad read: you treat someone as a station or a nit, they switch, and you lose more than equilibrium would have cost. Tell: your line only works against the exact type you assumed.
• Playing speculative hands without post-flop skill: you widen your range but cannot read or navigate later streets. Tell: you reach big pots with second-best hands and fold or call at the wrong moments.
• Making yourself the mistake-maker: you over-bet strong in-position hands and push worse hands out, or limp aces and bloat an unraised pot. Tell: opponents fold and you win only the blinds, or you lose all your chips in a multi-way pot.
• Predictable sizing and image: your bet sizes or tight image give your action away. Tell: opponents fold to your aggression and call only when you are strong.
• Bluffing the wrong target: you fire at loose players who call too much. Tell: repeated failed bluffs against the same opponent.

• ▸Opponent / seat: write name or seat number and approximate stack in big blinds.
• ▸Observed error type: note which applies — folds best hand, calls with worst, mis-sizes bets, too tight, or too loose.
• ▸Evidence: record the specific hands or actions that show it.
• ▸Image I have shown: note what they think of me (tight, loose, aggressive), including any hands shown.
• ▸Planned exploit: write the line (steal, bluff, value-bet, trap) and the street it happens on.
• ▸Sizing plan: list bet/raise sizes per street that keep the error alive.
• ▸Reliability check: rate your read (weak/solid) and note whether this opponent is a pro who may adjust.
• ▸Fallback: if the read is wrong or they adjust, name the equilibrium-style default you return to.
• ▸Result / lesson: after the hand, record chips won or lost and whether the error was induced or simply occurred.

1. 1Treat early accumulation as the goal of the early stage. The passage calls it 'pivotal early accumulation of chips,' so measure each early hand by whether it grows the stack, not by whether it merely survives.
2. 2Play big hands and bluffs the same way. The source says 'played the same way, your big hands protect your bluffs.' Pick one bet-sizing and line pattern for sets, overpairs, and bluffs, so opponents cannot sort your range by how you bet.
3. 3Do not slow-play aces early. Most players are deep-stacked and predatory opponents want to bust you. Unless you are superb at reading hands and players and know where you stand, bet or raise for value so the pot grows while you are ahead.
4. 4Consider over-betting big pairs early. The source notes that drastically over-betting aces early can pay off, because opponents with strong second-best hands may not believe you would bet that much when the blinds are tiny.
5. 5Count both ways to win before you bet. A bet or raise wins if opponents fold or if you show down the best hand. A call has only the showdown. Prefer the aggressive line when fold equity adds real value to the pot.
6. 6Price calls with pot odds and implied odds. Pot odds matter less in no-limit than in limit, but you still need a solid grasp of the math before you call. Learn implied odds even though they are less precise because information is incomplete.
7. 7Bank the psychological return of each win. After a pot that grows your stack, note the fold equity and fear equity you gained. Opponents who see their whole stack at risk this early think twice before entering pots against you.
8. 8Do not get married to a hand. If the line you chose meets a raise that threatens elimination with a marginal holding such as two small pair, folding is correct. Preserve the stack you have built.

The source describes a hand in which the author had about 19,000 chips left after investing a large amount. An opponent held two pair, faced possible elimination, and reluctantly folded. The final player to act held the nut flush draw (the ace and a small heart). He probably read the author as holding a made hand, most likely a set, against which he would be about a 2-to-1 underdog, so he folded too. The author's stack rose 25%, which he calls 'a big step toward the pivotal early accumulation of chips.' The extra gains were fold equity and fear equity: other players now know their chips can be threatened even early in a tournament. The author adds that he would have played the hand the same way with a set of queens. That consistency is why the opponents' read, 'probably a set,' was credible and why the fold came.

• If you hold aces or kings early and most stacks are deep, then bet or raise for value instead of slow-playing, because slow-playing invites players to bust you.
• If you are bluffing or holding a monster in the same spot, then use the same line and sizing, so your big hands protect your bluffs.
• If you can win by either a fold or a showdown, then favor betting or raising over calling, because calling gives you only one way to win.
• If you hold a marginal made hand such as two small pair and face a raise that could eliminate you, then fold and keep your stack rather than risk elimination early.
• If you must decide on a call, then check your pot odds and implied odds first, accepting that no-limit implied odds are less exact.

• Slow-playing big pairs early. The tell: you are crippled or eliminated by a player who was happy to oblige you, and you tell the hand as a bad-beat story.
• Playing monsters and bluffs differently. The tell: opponents fold to your bets when you are bluffing and pay you off only when you are weak, because your sizing or timing sorts your range.
• Calling too much instead of betting or raising. The tell: you win only at showdown and rarely pick up pots uncontested, so fold equity never accumulates.
• Getting married to a hand once you are in a big pot. The tell: you put your whole stack at risk early with two small pair against a line that clearly represents a set or better.
• Ignoring the math in no-limit because the stakes seem abstract. The tell: you call without reference to pot odds or implied odds.

• ▸Starting stack and stack at hand start: record chips before the hand to track growth.
• ▸Stage and blind level: note whether blinds are small relative to stacks.
• ▸Hand and board texture: write your hole cards and the key board features.
• ▸Action line you chose: bet, raise, call, or fold, with sizing.
• ▸Ways to win: mark fold, showdown, or both; a call has showdown only.
• ▸Same line with your other holdings? Yes/No: would you have played a monster or bluff the same way?
• ▸Pot odds / implied odds estimate: write the price and your rough implied-odds judgment.
• ▸Result and stack change (%): record the percentage change in your stack.
• ▸Fold equity / fear equity gained: note how opponents may now respond to you.

1. 1Anchor the framing first: prize equity is chip equity run through the payout structure. A chip decision is only as good as the money it moves. The supplied passages cover the chip side and name Chapter 6 (Prize Pools and Equities) and Appendix V (Limitations of ICM) for the conversion. They do not reproduce the ICM formulas, so use a separate ICM calculator or those chapters for the exact numbers.
2. 2Record the structure before you play: number of entrants, first prize, and how steeply the prizes fall. The book's own scale references are the 2009 EPT Grand Final (about 950 entrants, 2.5 million euro first prize) and the Sunday Millions (around 8,000 players). A top-heavy field rewards accumulation differently from a flat one.
3. 3Classify the stage. Early, a chip is worth close to its face value, and the book calls early accumulation 'pivotal.' Later, especially near the money and as antes start (after the first 5 or 6 levels), each decision has to be judged against what the pay jumps do to your finishing odds.
4. 4For every large decision, write the chip price first: chips risked, chips won if called, and the resulting odds. Then add fold equity, since a bet or raise can win by folds as well as at showdown. Calling has only one way to win, and folding gives up all equity.
5. 5Check your own edge before giving up equity. The book's rule is that poker is zero-sum, so a speculative play such as 64o on the button is acceptable only if you are the best or second-best player at the table. Otherwise muck it.
6. 6Convert the result into prize terms: stack before and after, translated through the payout structure. A gain such as a 25% stack increase is a chip result. Whether it is worth the risk depends on how much that stack change moves your expected prize.
7. 7Stress-test the answer against the limits of the model. Treat ICM output as a guide, not a verdict. The book devotes an appendix to ICM's limitations, so note which of its assumptions (such as equal skill) your table violates.
8. 8After the hand, log the decision against its price, not its result. Record the odds you took, the fold equity you assumed, and the stack change, so you can see whether your equity estimates hold up over many hands.

Early in a major tournament, Lee Nelson moves all-in on a flop with a flush draw plus other outs. The pot already holds more than 5,000, and any caller adds another 19,000. He risks just under 20,000 to win 24,000 if called, which is about 1.2-to-1. Against an over-pair or two pair he is a favorite. Against an unsuspected set he is a roughly 1.5-to-1 underdog, so he accepts a small underlay there. The deciding factor is fold equity: players might fold even bottom set this early, when they have committed only about 5% of their chips. Jason folds aces without the ace of hearts. Mark Vos folds pocket tens. A third player folds 54 (two small pair) after 6 minutes in the tank, with only 1,225 invested and nearly 19,000 behind. The last player, holding the nut flush draw, folds as well. Nelson's stack rises 25%, which the book calls a big step in pivotal early accumulation. He also gains 'fold equity' and 'fear equity' against players who now know their chips can be threatened. The prize-equity reading is that, early on, chips convert to expected prize money at close to face value, so a gain like this is close to a straight prize-equity gain. Late in the tournament the same chip gain would need to be run through the payout structure.

• If it is early and your chip price is near 1.2-to-1 with strong fold equity, then take the aggressive play: each chip gained converts to prize equity at close to face value.
• If you are not the best or second-best player at the table, then skip negative-equity speculative plays such as 64o, because poker is zero-sum and your loss is the better player's gain.
• If a play wins only when called and you are an underdog to the likely caller's range, then compare your price against that range before moving in. Fold equity has to make up the difference.
• If a decision would put your whole stack at risk and the payout structure rewards survival, then run it through ICM or Chapter 6 before relying on chip-EV logic.
• If the situation violates ICM's assumptions (see Appendix V, Limitations of ICM), then adjust the ICM answer by judgment rather than following it blindly.

• Treating chip EV as prize EV at every stage. The tell: you make the same all-in call with the same price at every stage and never reference the payout structure.
• Judging decisions by results. The tell: you call a play wrong because you ran into a set, rather than checking whether the 1.2-to-1 price and fold equity justified it.
• Copying expert loose play without the edge. The tell: you play 64o or other trash from the button against opponents at your own level, giving up equity you cannot win back post-flop.
• Ignoring fold equity or assuming it where none exists. The tell: your bets are never folded to, or you only evaluate showdown equity and never the chance of an instant win.
• Trusting ICM numbers blindly. The tell: you cite an ICM figure without checking its assumptions, which the book itself flags as limited.

• ▸Entrants and first prize: enter the field size and top prize to size the payout structure.
• ▸Stage: early, mid, or near the money; note whether antes have started.
• ▸Stack before the decision: your chip count.
• ▸Chips risked / chips won if called: record both and the resulting ratio, e.g. just under 20,000 to win 24,000 = about 1.2-to-1.
• ▸Estimated fold equity: your estimate of how often opponents fold, and why (e.g. only about 5% of their chips committed).
• ▸Equity when called: your win chance against the likely calling range.
• ▸Stack after a win: new chip count and percentage change (e.g. +25%).
• ▸ICM / prize-equity value before and after: from an ICM calculator or Chapter 6.
• ▸Skill edge check: am I the best or second-best player at this table? Yes or no.
• ▸Post-hand review: was the price correct regardless of the result? Note any ICM limitation that applied.

1. 1Set your default to bet, raise, or move in; call only with a stated reason. Before each decision, ask what the raise accomplishes (fold equity, value, or chips) before you consider calling. Calling is reserved for speculative hands in position where a re-raise behind you is unlikely.
2. 2Read your stack in CSI terms before choosing a line. As blinds rise you feel pressure to move. The Aggressive and Move-in stages are ones most pros want to leave quickly: they don't wait for premium hands, they want chips or they bust trying. Too-tight play gets you blinded away, so that when you finally double up you are still short.
3. 3Reset your effective stack to the hand in front of you. If you are chip leader among the remaining active hands, act as if you have the CSI of your largest opponent still in the hand. Your extra chips are not in play. On the button with CSI 15 versus blinds of 6 and 4, act as CSI 6 if it folds to you.
4. 4Size your aggression to the depth of your stack and your opponent's on every street. Before the first bet, check that you will still have chips to maneuver on the turn and river. A bet that leaves you with no follow-up has no flexibility, and a bet that leaves your opponent with good odds and chips behind invites a call.
5. 5Play value hands and bluffs through the same lines. Bet size, timing and street sequence should be identical, so a bet never defines your hand. The authors' example: check/call the flop with a flush draw, then raise a turn bet when the flush misses. This reads as a set or two pair, and solid players often muck top pair.
6. 6Pick targets by what they do wrong. Low-buy-in players call too frequently and call big bets with poor draws, so don't bluff them much. Good players are the better targets for the advanced check/raise bluff. At medium buy-ins, general bubble tightening is exploitable. Big stacks avoid each other, and everyone should be extremely tight when the short stack is very short.
7. 7Use chip lead as a license to pressure, not to gamble blindly. When you cover everyone, your chips lose relative value, so you can raise the aggression level. In the 6-handed example (400,000 versus five stacks of about 200,000), losing 80,000 leaves you at 320,000 with the lead intact.
8. 8Answer being bullied with a decision, not a mood. If you are re-raised three times in a row, either 4-bet all-in with a marginal hand when you have enough fold equity, or tighten your opening range and stop open-raising non-premium hands for a while. Either way, stay respected at the table.

2006 WSOP $2,000 NLHE, heads-up: Mark Vos against Nam Le, with Vos in the lead. Vos raises to 90,000 from the button and Le calls with 66. On the Q-8-3 flop Le checks, Vos bets 150,000, and Le calls. On the 2 turn Le checks again, Vos bets 250,000, and Le calls. The river is the Q, Le checks, and Vos moves in. Le thinks for quite a while and calls; Vos shows Q-T for trip queens. Vos bet every street, with the bets escalating from 150,000 to 250,000 to an all-in. That is the same line a bluff would take, which is why Le could not fold his way out. The source adds that all-ins are now often suspected of being bluffs, so the strongest bet can be called more than a smaller one. The lesson is that a value shove built from a bluff-shaped sequence gets paid, so you keep the pressure consistent rather than shrinking the final bet to look strong.

• If your options are call or raise and you have no position and no reason to speculate, then raise or fold. Call only with very speculative hands, in position, when a re-raise behind you is unlikely.
• If any raise exceeds about 6% of the smaller stack, then don't call it to see a flop; the implied odds aren't there.
• If you cover every opponent still in the hand, then your chips have less relative value, so apply more pressure. If you don't, play to the largest opponent's stack.
• If you've been re-raised three times in a row and have enough fold equity, then 4-bet all-in with a marginal hand. If you lack the fold equity, tighten your opening range for a while.
• If you have less than average chips at an aggressive table, then consider the UTG limp/re-raise with AK. It builds fold equity, and if a JJ or QQ calls you are only a 13/10 underdog with a double-up available.

• Playing too tight as blinds climb and waiting for premium hands. Tell: you fold into the Aggressive or Move-in stage, double up once, and are still short.
• Aggression without control: shoving or betting rashly regardless of circumstances and becoming a railbird. Tell: you bust early in the tournament without having tracked stack depth or CSI.
• Betting so that you have no chips left to maneuver on later streets. Tell: you can't make a turn or river follow-up and your fold equity is gone.
• Bluffing opponents who call too much, such as low-buy-in players who call big bets with poor draws. Tell: your bluffs get called and your showdown hands go through unchanged.
• Letting your bet size define your hand, such as betting small with value and big with bluffs. Tell: opponents fold to your bluffs but call your value, or vice versa.

• ▸My CSI / effective CSI: Convert your stack to CSI, then reset it to the largest opponent still in the hand if you cover the others.
• ▸Position and who is behind: List who can re-raise behind you; a raise-or-fold spot behind a likely re-raiser needs more caution.
• ▸Hand category (value/bluff/speculative): Name the category, then confirm the line and sizing you plan would be identical for the other category.
• ▸Opponent type and buy-in context: Mark them as caller, tight bubble player, aggressive stealer, or good player; low-buy-in callers are poor bluff targets.
• ▸Fold equity estimate: Write how often they fold to this bet; skip the bluff if you can't justify it.
• ▸Chips left after this bet: State your stack and theirs after the action and whether you can still bet the next street.
• ▸Last three hands: Note whether you've been re-raised three times in a row; if yes, choose a 4-bet shove or a tighter opening range.
• ▸Decision: raise / move in / fold / call: If call, write the stated reason (position, implied odds, no raise behind).

1. 1Start with the stack, not the pot. Before you bet or raise, write down the effective stack and ask what percentage of it your amount commits. The source's threshold is 40% or more of the opponent's stack: a call at that size makes the opponent think about being pot-committed.
2. 2Pick a target who can be pressured. Isolate one opponent you cover in chips, ideally one with a stack that makes the all-in decision painful (final-table pay jumps are the example). The source's Fricke sat on Hansen's left, covered him, and kept re-raising to amounts that would pot-commit Gus.
3. 3Size the raise so the remaining stack is small and the pot odds look cheap but the decision is final. In the source example, a re-raise to 250,000 against a 600,000 stack leaves him 350,000 and about 550,000 in the pot. Calling then means all the chips go in, either pre-flop or on the flop. Raising only 150,000-180,000 commits about 30% and lets him call comfortably.
4. 4Choose the bet-size theory deliberately. Small-ball uses small value bets and small bluffs so the size reveals nothing. The other theory uses big (often all-in) bets with both the nuts and bluffs. Pick one per spot and use it for both your value hands and your bluffs, so the size gives no clue.
5. 5Check whether all-ins are respected at your table. The source notes that all-ins are now often suspected as bluffs, and pros often give smaller-than-all-in bets more respect, reading them as 'suck bets'. If opponents are calling shoves with marginal hands, size down. If they fold to pressure, size up.
6. 6Size against draws deliberately. A raise that is too small gives a drawing hand good odds and leaves a stack big enough to have fold equity on the turn. A raise that is too big takes away his chance to bluff and gets a fold. Choose the size for the result you want: a fold, or a call from a hand you beat.
7. 7Balance the sizing line with bluffs. Using one size for monsters and bluffs only works if opponents can't tell which you have. Check the board for scare cards or two-ended draws that make both stories plausible.
8. 8Re-check the table before firing. Another player can wake up with a monster and re-raise your move. Your raise has already given you the pot odds to call, so you may be forced to call. Use position and track every stack before sizing.

The source gives the blinds/antes as 10,000/20,000/2,000. You hold KQo on the button with 1.8 million. A cutoff opponent with 600,000 raises to 60,000, a range that includes A2s-ATs, 22-88 and A8o-AJo, hands he does not want to play for all his chips. A normal re-raise to 150,000-180,000 commits only about 30% of his stack, so he can call reasonably. You raise to 250,000 instead. If he calls, the pot will be about 550,000 and he will have only 350,000 left. Calling is then a move-in-or-fold decision, since all the chips go in pre-flop or on the flop. Most players will fold everything but TT+, AK and AQs. If he folds, he keeps about 90% of his original stack, but he has given up the pot. The pressure comes from the size, not from your KQ.

• If a raise would commit 40% or more of the opponent's stack, then expect him to treat a call as pot-commitment. Use it against ranges that are mostly stealing hands or medium-strength hands.
• If you raise only 25-30% of his stack, then expect a wider calling range. Don't use that size when you want folds.
• If you raise too small on a drawing flop, then you give the draw good odds and a stack to bluff with on the turn. Raise enough that the draw can't profitably call or bluff you later.
• If you raise so big that the opponent has no fold equity or bluffing room, then expect him to fold his draw. If you want the call, size lower so he can still call and shove.
• If opponents are calling all-ins loosely, then stop expecting folds from shoves. Size down, and use bigger sizes for value. If they respect only all-ins, shove for fold equity.
• If another player behind could have a monster, then don't make the move. A re-raise would force you to call with the odds you created.

• Choosing a size by habit, such as a standard raise of 150-180K, when the stack math says it commits only 30%. The tell is that opponents call comfortably and see flops against you.
• Using one fixed bet size for everything and assuming it hides your hand. The tell is that sharp opponents fold or raise accurately because the board and size tell a clear story.
• Shoving automatically because all-in is the strongest bet. The tell is that opponents, especially pros, call you with marginal hands more often than they call smaller bets.
• Raising too little on a draw-heavy flop. The tell is that the opponent calls with odds and later shoves the turn, putting you in the difficult decision you meant to give him.
• Picking the wrong target, or ignoring players behind. The tell is a monster re-raise that forces you to call because of the pot odds you created.
• Rubbing a good player's nose in a successful bluff, such as flashing the cards, which risks creating a monster. The tell is that the opponent starts re-raising you.

• ▸Opponent's effective stack: write the chip count you both have behind.
• ▸Pot before your action: include blinds, antes and any raise.
• ▸Candidate size #1 (chips) and % of his stack: divide your amount by his stack.
• ▸Candidate size #2 (chips) and % of his stack: repeat for a second size.
• ▸Stack left if he calls and resulting pot odds: note the chips left and the price to continue.
• ▸Opponent's range at each size: list which hands call, fold or re-raise.
• ▸Target outcome: write down whether you want a fold, a call from a weaker hand, or a shove.
• ▸Draw check: list possible draws and whether the size gives them correct odds or fold equity.
• ▸Table check: note players behind you, stack sizes and any pay-jump pressure.

1. 1Fix the definition before you open a chart. An equilibrium play is the best play against an opponent who also plays optimally. It is defensive, built on not being exploited. If you play it, his best response is his own equilibrium strategy, and whoever deviates loses expectation. Adherence means staying on that line until you have a reason to leave it.
2. 2Use two separate rank orders. One orders hands for pushing (Appendix III) and a different one orders hands for calling (Appendix IV). The source says to take the top X% of hands from the right list for the action you are taking. Never reuse one list for both.
3. 3Pull the equilibrium numbers from the right place. Appendix I gives the moving-in solution far from the money, and Appendix II gives the matching calling strategies. Learn these as the baseline. Appendix V covers the limits of ICM, so check it before trusting the numbers near the bubble or pay jumps.
4. 4Learn the why, not just the chart. The authors say the algebra is high-school level and that the 'why' becomes common sense with experience, so plays become almost automatic. For each chart cell, know which condition it rests on: the opponent is indifferent, and you break even on the marginal play.
5. 5Test every bet or shove for the break-even balance. Your bluffs should make his calls break even, and his calls should make your bluffs break even. Compute his required call frequency from the pot and effective stack. All-in with a pot of 100 and stack S, he must call 100/(100+S) of the time.
6. 6Set deviations deliberately. The source says you would be correct to fold a hand like A5s if opponents are not as tight as the chart assumes. Depart from equilibrium only when you have a specific read on how opponents' ranges differ from the assumed ones. Do not depart because of a hunch.
7. 7Check your own frequencies after each session. Count how often you pushed and called from each bucket. Compare that to the chart's percentages and note each departure and why.

The source's all-in balance example shows what an equilibrium looks like in numbers. The pot is $100 and you hit your draw with probability p = 10%. With a small $10 bet that always gets called, you win $110 and your EV is $11 on a $10 equity. With a pot-sized bet you get even money on a steal, so he must call half the time. He gets 2-to-1 on calls, so you bluff p/2 = 5% of the time. You break even on bluffs, he breaks even on calls, and your good hands average $150. Now go all-in with an effective stack of S = 900. He must call 100/(100+S) = 10% of the time. You win the $100 pot uncontested 90% of the time and $1,000 the other 10%, so EV = 100*90% + 1000*10% = $190. You bluff just often enough that his calls are break-even, so he cannot exploit you by always folding or always calling. The same discipline applies to push/fold. You pick frequencies that leave the opponent indifferent, and any deviation costs the one who deviates.

• If you are choosing a hand to push, then use the pushing rank order, and if you are choosing a hand to call, then use the calling rank order. A hand like 87s is a decent push because it holds value against strong callers, but a poor call because it is almost always behind.
• If your opponents call more often than the equilibrium assumes, then tighten your marginal pushes. Folding something like A5s becomes correct. The source adds that it is generally not the case that opponents call more than equilibrium.
• If the stage is near the money or a pay jump, then do not treat the far-from-the-money tables as automatic. Check ICM and its limits (Appendix V).
• If you have no concrete evidence of how an opponent deviates, then stay on the equilibrium line, since you suffer in expectation by deviating.
• If a bet or shove has no matching bluff or call balance, then rework the frequencies until your opponent's marginal decision is break-even.

• Using one hand ranking for both pushing and calling. The tell is calling with hands like 87s because they 'push well'.
• Treating the tables as exploitative advice. The tell is shoving or calling the same way against every opponent and never asking whether his ranges match the assumed tightness.
• Applying far-from-the-money numbers at every stage. The tell is the same chart near the bubble or a pay jump, with no ICM check.
• Memorising charts without the 'why'. The tell is freezing when stacks, antes or blinds differ from the chart, or being unable to compute the break-even call frequency.
• Leaving equilibrium on a hunch. The tell is that you cannot name the opponent behaviour that justified the deviation.

• ▸Stage and distance from the money: note whether it is far from the money or near a bubble or pay jump, and whether you checked ICM limits.
• ▸Action type: mark push or call so you pull the right rank order.
• ▸Hand and bucket: write your hand and the top-X% bucket it falls in on that list.
• ▸Chart answer: record what the Appendix I or II equilibrium says to do.
• ▸Effective stack and pot: write these so you can compute the opponent's required call frequency.
• ▸Break-even check: state whether the opponent is indifferent at your frequency.
• ▸What you did: record push, call or fold, and note if it differs from the chart.
• ▸Deviation reason: name the observed opponent behaviour that justified any departure, or write none.
• ▸Result and review note: record the outcome and whether the deviation was supported by the read.

1. 1Count your stack in rounds, not chips. Divide your stack by the cost of one full round of blinds and antes. The excerpt gives one hard threshold: at 10 rounds or fewer, a push-or-fold pre-flop strategy is close to optimal. Above it, other tactics apply. The excerpt does not define CSI/CPR or the Rule of 5 and 10, so take those formulas from the book's endgame chapters and don't improvise them here.
2. 2Do the same count for the players around you, especially the ones who act after you. In tournaments chips change value, so small stacks tend to limp along trying to fold into the money, big stacks bully them, and big stacks mostly avoid each other. Mark who is bullying and who is being bullied before choosing a hand.
3. 3If you are deep early (the second-level Bellagio example had 6,000 starting chips at 50/100), treat speculative hands as implied-odds plays. Pre-flop raises are small relative to stacks, so small and medium pairs, suited connectors, and even junk in position are cheap tickets to a flop that can win a whole stack. If you miss, you lose a small pot.
4. 4Weight position heavily when widening. The loose-aggressive logic (Gus Hansen's) is to play many hands, especially in position, and stack an opponent who holds a hand that looks unsuspected. Out of position against a strong player, do it only when stack depth justifies it, as in the Goehring hand.
5. 5Play big hands fast while stacks are deep. Aces and kings arrive about once per 110 hands, and slow-playing them lets speculative hands outdraw you or bust you. Bet them, and sometimes drastically overbet them, unless you are superb at reading hands and players.
6. 6Shift gears as the field shrinks. Near the bubble, survivors are tight, tired, and edgy, and short stacks are the ones that gain from extra aggression. Cash-style patience and deep-stack trapping give way to pressure and fold equity.
7. 7Re-check stack depth, position, and table dynamics every orbit. Also check your own image, since the authors call the ability to constantly adapt to dynamics, image, blinds, and stacks 'absolutely essential.' If you drop to 10 rounds or fewer, stop postflop play and switch to push or fold.
8. 8Against top new-school players who have position on you, stay out of their way unless you hold a monster. Don't call off a stack with top pair when their line says they have you beat.

April 2007, Bellagio, $3,120 buy-in, 6,000 starting chips, blinds 50/100 (second level). Alan Goehring is chip leader with 26,000+ and Alan Cunningham is second at the table with about 13,000. Goehring has been taking many flops, even against raises. He limps UTG with 6-4, Cunningham raises to 400 with A-K, and Goehring calls out of position. The flop is 5-3-2, giving Goehring the nuts and Cunningham a nut flush draw with overcards and a gutshot. Goehring check-raises to about 1,600 after Cunningham bets about 700, then bets about 1,600 more on the 4 turn, taunting a raise. On the J river Goehring bets about 6,000 and Cunningham calls. The hand cost Cunningham 9,600 and left him 3,400, while Goehring went past 35,000, nearly six times his starting stack. The lesson is that the deep stacks made a small pre-flop call cheap relative to the pot it could win. A top-5% hand range would never have entered, and the pre-flop equity edge for A-K was irrelevant once the flop connected.

• If your stack is 10 times the cost of a round of blinds and antes or less, then use push-or-fold pre-flop with specific stack-based guidelines and drop speculative postflop play.
• If you are deep-stacked in the early levels and raises are small relative to stacks, then add speculative hands (small to medium pairs, suited connectors), most freely in position, for implied odds.
• If you pick up aces early while deep, then bet them hard (an overbet can pay) rather than slow-playing, unless you have an exceptional read.
• If a top loose-aggressive player has position on you and escalates, then fold top pair or an overpair and stay out of the way without a monster.
• If the bubble is near and opponents are tight with short stacks, then raise your aggression. If you are a short stack yourself, expect big stacks to pressure you and avoid each other.

• Slow-playing aces or kings early. The tell is getting stacked or crippled by sets, straights, and two pair from hands that called cheaply.
• Playing only the top 5% (pocket 9s or better, A-Q suited, A-K) in deep early play. The tell is folding while others get huge implied odds on small pairs and suited connectors, and you never build a stack.
• Treating stack depth as fixed. The tell is the same hand selection at 100 big blinds and at 10 rounds, so you call or shove wrongly after the push-or-fold threshold.
• Calling off a stack with top-pair top-kicker against a loose-aggressive player who has position. The tell is facing a river decision for most of your chips after a turn raise, then being shown a set or a made straight.
• Importing deep-stack cash-game patience or trapping into late tournament play. The tell is nibbling cautiously while tight, short-stacked opponents are folding to pressure you never apply.

• ▸My stack in chips: write your current count.
• ▸Cost of one round (blinds plus antes): the total paid per orbit.
• ▸Rounds of stack: stack divided by round cost. If 10 or less, use push-or-fold.
• ▸Stack stage: name your stage (normal, semi-aggressive, aggressive, move-in, special) using your own thresholds from the book.
• ▸Position and who acts behind: note seat, button distance, and the stacks of players still to act.
• ▸Table roles: list who is bullying, who is folding into the money, and which big stacks avoid each other.
• ▸Opponent type: mark any loose-aggressive player with position on me and the hands I will fold against them.
• ▸Hand plan: speculative hand for implied odds, premium to bet fast, or fold-equity move.
• ▸Review after orbit: was the stage right, and what changed (stack, bubble distance, image)?

1. 1Express your stack in rounds, not chips: divide your chips by the cost of one round (blinds plus antes). The passages draw the line at 10x. At 10 rounds or fewer, push-or-fold is 'close to optimal'. Above that, you have post-flop options.
2. 2Classify your stage before choosing a hand range. Deep (early levels, raises small relative to stacks): speculative hands are playable. Mid-depth: blind stealing becomes 'essential' after the first 5 or 6 levels, especially once antes start. 10x or less: push or fold pre-flop.
3. 3When deep, size your pre-flop investment as a small fraction of your stack. Use the Rule of 5 and 10 and the Rule of 3 and 6 (pages 51 and 70 of the source) to set how much to invest with small pairs, suited connectors, 1-gap suited connectors and suited aces. Unsuited connectors may be limped from the button or small blind for a small percentage of your stack.
4. 4Pick your deep-stack plan by your post-flop skill. Strong readers can widen the range and play many pots. Players who fear being outplayed post-flop use the tight-image plan instead: roughly 55+, AQs+ and AK. Raise QQ-AA, and play small pairs for a small raise, but fold them unless you flop a set.
5. 5Treat deep-stack equity as flop-dependent. AK is a 67/33 favorite over T3 pre-flop but about a 30/70 underdog if a 10 or 3 flops without an ace or king. Because early raises are small relative to stacks, a hit with a weak hand can win the opponent's whole stack.
6. 6Re-measure the big blind's stack before each steal. The bigger his stack relative to yours, the harder he is to steal from. Then adjust for his type, your hand, your recent steals and whether he just won a pot.
7. 7Scale aggression to the cost of a round. Early on, blinds are tiny relative to stacks, so over-betting aces can pay off. When your stack is down to about 10 rounds, switch to push-or-fold with the specific guidelines for your stack-to-blind ratio.
8. 8Re-evaluate every orbit and every level change. Your stack in rounds shrinks as blinds and antes rise, even when your chip count does not change. Adapt to table dynamics, your image and the blinds and stacks, as the authors say is essential.

The source's early-level hand shows what deep stacks allow. Blinds are 25/50. You raise AK to 200 from early position and Patrik Antonius calls on the button. The flop is A-3-4 and you bet 400 into 475. He calls. On the 2 turn you bet 1,000 and he thinks for about a minute and raises 1,500. The stacks are deep and the pot is small relative to them, so a call likely leads to a decision for most or all of your remaining chips on the river. Antonius's possible holdings include 33, 44, A3, 45 and A6, all of which beat or compete with top pair, and that is the cost of playing deep against a player who plays almost any two cards. The same depth that lets him call 200 with weak hands lets you avoid that minefield. Reduce your stack to about 10 rounds and the picture flips: you stop playing post-flop and push or fold pre-flop. The only variable that changed is stack relative to the round cost.

• If your stack is 10x a round of blinds and antes or less, then push or fold pre-flop using the stack-specific guidelines, because it is close to optimal.
• If stacks are deep and you read hands and players well, then play small pairs, suited connectors, 1-gap suited connectors and suited aces for a small raise or a cheap flop. You are buying implied odds to win a big pot or double up.
• If stacks are deep and you doubt your post-flop skill, then narrow to roughly 55+, AQs+ and AK, raise big pairs, and build a tight image to exploit later.
• If you are past the first 5 or 6 levels, antes have started, and the big blind is short-stacked and passive, then steal. If he is deep or re-raises often, upgrade your steal hands.
• If you have stolen two or three times recently, then raise only with a hand that can stand a re-raise, because semi-aggressive players tend to play back at you on the third raise.

• Counting chips instead of rounds. The tell: you feel comfortable with a stack that is already at 10x or less of the round cost and keep playing post-flop poker.
• Playing speculative hands without post-flop skill. The tell: you invest in 64s or T7s and then fold or stack off against players who also hold a wide range, and the source says optimal play here requires great reading and post-flop skills.
• Slow-playing big pairs while deep. The tell: you lose a big pot or your stack to an opponent who flopped a set or a straight with a speculative hand.
• Stealing at the same frequency regardless of the blind's stack and type. The tell: repeated re-raises from a deep or aggressive big blind, or from a pro who just won a pot and is baiting you.
• Staying in the early-level strategy as blinds and antes climb. The tell: you are still playing tight and waiting for aces after level 5 or 6, and your stack in rounds keeps shrinking.

• ▸My chips: current stack in chips.
• ▸Cost per round: small blind + big blind + all antes.
• ▸Stack in rounds: chips divided by cost per round.
• ▸Stage: deep, mid or 10x-or-less. At 10 or fewer, mark push-or-fold.
• ▸Level number: note whether levels 5-6 and antes have been reached, which makes stealing essential.
• ▸Big blind's stack in rounds: the bigger it is relative to mine, the harder the steal.
• ▸Big blind's type: passive, aggressive, or just won a pot.
• ▸My recent steals: count of steals in the last orbits, to decide if my hand must withstand a re-raise.
• ▸Chosen plan: speculative wide, tight-image, steal, or push-or-fold.